insight that incentives affect performance by shaping managers' behavior remains implicit to these studies. A more conclusive support for the principal-agent framework requires studying not only the indirect incentive-performance association but also the theoretical mechanism that mediates the two -namely, managerial behavior (Murphy, 1999) . Unfortunately, there is scant empirical work on the latter topic. Using the market for entrepreneurial finance as an empirical setting, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of these issues.
Specifically, corporate venture capital provides an attractive setting to study all three elements of the principal-agent framework. Theoretically, the framework analyzes how incentives shape managerial investment in profitable yet uncertain projects. It thus parallels our setting: CVC personnel invest in new ventures whose technological viability and commercial prospects are highly uncertain. Importantly, this setting affords empirical investigation that goes beyond correlating incentives and performance. We open the 'black box' and document a direct relationship between incentives and the investment practices managers engage in. The paper therefore addresses a lacuna in the principal-agent literature. Moreover, our research setting affords intuitive interpretation of managerial action and corporate performance in the spirit of Jensen (1993) and Hamel (1999) -to the extent that independent venture capitalists (IVC) are expert investors, they serve as a benchmark against which corporate venture capitalists can be assessed.
To that end, the paper conducts extensive analyses of venture capital investors during the 1990s. We study the direct relationship between investors' compensation schemes and investment practices using a sample of 13,096 investment rounds by corporate and independent venture capitalists. This analysis focuses on investment practices that CVCs and IVCs commonly use to manage investment uncertainty (Gompers and Lerner, 2001) : staging (i.e., targeting distinct stages of a venture's development; Gompers, 1995) and syndication (i.e., co-investing a round by two or more investors; Lerner, 1994) . For instance, analysis of investment stage indicates that CVC investors target ventures at later stages of development. That is, the investment practices of CVCs and IVCs differ. Interestingly, the magnitude of the difference is affected by the nature of corporate venture capitalists' compensation. It is large when CVC personnel receive little or no performance-pay, yet shrinks significantly when they are awarded performance-pay. Analysis of investment syndicates yields similar results.
We also compare investors' ultimate performance as a function of their compensation schemes. The analysis covers 2,830 corporate and independent investors who participated in the aforementioned rounds. A similar pattern emerges: CVCs experience successful portfolio exits at a rate that differs from IVCs, and the magnitude of the performance gap is sensitive to CVCs' incentives. It is large when CVC personnel are awarded performance-pay, and diminishes when they receive little or no performance-pay. We present mediation models which further illustrate that the compensation-performance association is mediated by managers' investment practices.
We review the principal-agent literature below. The following section develops the hypotheses. Data, methods, and results are discussed thereafter. The last section concludes.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The principal-agent framework analyzes the relationship between incentives and risk-taking behavior. A key upshot is that compensation schemes may be used to guide a manager toward performance maximizing choices by affecting his or her risk preferences. This section reviews major theoretical and empirical findings and points at areas for further investigation.
Theoretically, an agency relationship is said to exist between a firm's shareholders (i.e., principal) and its managers (i.e., agents). Principal-agent models assume shareholders are riskneutral as they can hold a diversified portfolio while managers are risk-averse because their job security and income are tied to one firm. From the manager's perspective, fixed salary is an efficient risk-sharing arrangement. The risk-averse manager receives a guaranteed pay while risk-neutral shareholders take on the risk associated with uncertain future outcomes (Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979) . From the shareholders' perspective, managers should maximize firm value by undertaking all positive net present value projects regardless of their riskiness (hereafter we use risk and variance interchangeably; c.f., Mansfield, 1981) . Risk-averse managers, however, would opt for low variance projects and may pass up some positive but risky NPV projects that shareholders would like to pursue. Absent an ability to monitor managerial action, shareholders have to motivate managers.
They can do so by offering performance-pay. Having a manager bear some of the uncertainty regarding future performance will induce her to invest in profitable yet risky projects, which may otherwise be foregone as too risky (Holmstrom, 1979) . In sum, a key characteristic of designing a compensation scheme is the need to trade off risk-sharing (managerial perspective) and motivation (principal perspective) (Levinthal, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989) . The ensuing compensation scheme shapes managerial behavior and ultimately affects firm performance.
This insight stimulated a large body of empirical work. Most studies explore the association between executive compensation and firm performance. The evidence, however, is inconclusive. Gomez-Mejia (1994:199) , for instance, states that "it is amazing how little we know about executive pay in spite of the massive volume of empirical work… even more discouraging, when taken as a whole, results are conflicting and disappointing." A literature overview by a leading compensation economist, Murphy (1999 Murphy ( :2539 , also notes "…there is surprisingly little direct evidence that higher pay-performance sensitivities lead to higher performance." Management scholars echo that observation: "Researchers express shock when they find pay/performance sensitivities are low and the results inconsistent with their theory." (Tosi, Werner, Katz, Gomez-Mejia, 2000:331) . Recently, Dalton, Daily, Certo, Roengpitya (2003:14) conducted a meta-analysis of 229 studies in economics, finance, and management, and concluded that "…the empirical evidence provides no consensus."
In an attempt to resolve the apparent inconsistencies, extant work explores alternative measures and various contingency effects (e.g., Carpenter and Wade, 2002; Core, Holthausen, Larcker 1999; Quinn and Rivoli, 1993; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Rajagopalan, 1996) . Common to these studies is the focus on incentive-performance association and failure to explicitly test for the theoretical insight that compensation influences behavior, which in turn, affects performance. Murphy (1999) acknowledges the difficulty in testing the principal-agent framework. He argues that case studies (e.g., Jensen and Barry, 1991; Wruck, 1994) support the theory by documenting that managers' actions are affected by incentives. Beyond anecdotal case-based studies, however, there is little evidence of a compensation-behavior relationship. The dearth of large scale empirical work reflects measurement challenges: it is difficult to systematically observe the level of risk inherent to managerial action. Two notable exceptions are Datta, Iskandar-Datta, Raman (2001) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) . The latter paper analyzes oil and gas companies, finding that projects with high cash-flow variance are undertaken by managers with significant performance-pay. The former studies M&A and reports that managers with large equity compensation engage in riskier takeovers.
Another empirical challenge has to do with evidence for non-executives managers. Extant work focuses on the relationship between the compensation scheme of the CEO, or other top executives, and firms' financial (Abowd, 1990) , operational (Conyon and Freeman, 2004) , or innovative performance (Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000) . For top executives, compensation data are readily available per SEC regulations. Managers outside the executive suite -those heading business divisions, or directing R&D units -may have a substantial impact on the firm (Chandler, 1991; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988 ). Yet, there is far less work on these managers as compensation data are hard to come by. Hoskisson, Hitt, Hill (1993) and Holthausen, Larcker, Sloan (1995) , two notable exceptions, find that the compensation of heads of business divisions is associated with divisional performance. Recently, Lerner and Wulf (2006) report parallel findings for R&D-unit heads: high-powered incentives are associated with superior patenting output.
To conclude, the principal-agent framework suggests that the sensitivity of managerial compensation to outcomes affects managers' choice of risky projects and consequently impacts firm's performance. There is abundance of empirical work, yet the evidence is inconclusive and mainly reports indirect association between compensation and performance. Only a handful of studies explore the direct compensation-behavior relationship, and that work is limited to top executives yet ignores other managers who play critical roles within the corporation.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The market for entrepreneurial finance is uniquely apt for studying the effect of compensation on behavior and performance. Funding entrepreneurial ventures is tantamount to investment in risky projects due to high level of uncertainty regarding technological feasibility, future demand, etc. (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Scherer, Harhoff, Kukies, 2000) . To the extent that IVCs are expert investors, they constitute an informed benchmark against which to contrast CVCs' behavior (Jensen, 1993; Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004) . In other words, because corporate and independent venture capitalists invest side-by-side, the context facilitates an investigation of the effects of organizational reality in which CVC personnel operate. Below, we describe independent and corporate investors, their compensation schemes, and proceed to conjecture on the implications to investors' practices and performance.
Independent VC funds are limited partnerships that pool and manage money from entities such as pension funds and wealthy individuals. IVCs seek high financial returns by funding growth-oriented ventures from which they later exit via an IPO or an acquisition (Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . They manage all aspects of the investment from opportunity identification through due diligence process and post investment monitoring. IVCs also offer value-added services to portfolio companies (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza and Manigart, 1996; Timmons, 1994) .
Through their corporate venture capital programs, established firms are also important players in the venture capital market (Prowse, 1998; Timmons, 1994) . Their objectives vary, though: some focus on achieving financial gains, while most CVC programs seek a window on novel technologies (Siegel et al., 1988; Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a,b; Ziedonis, 2005, 2008 ; Keil, 2002 Keil, , 2004 . Corporate investors assist portfolio companies by (a) providing value-added services similar to IVC funds (Block and MacMillan, 1993) , (b) leveraging corporate resources; e.g. corporate laboratories, firm's network of suppliers (Maula and Murray, 2001; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b) , and (c) endorsing the venture vis-à-vis third parties (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999) .
Of particular interest is the fact the compensation schemes vary greatly across investors.
Independent venture capitalists have a substantial performance-pay component. They receive 'carried interest' -about 20% of the profits the fund generated (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . IVCs also collect a second pay component: a fixed annual 'management fee' which amounts to 1.5% -3.0% of fund's assets. Note that IVC funds are run by a handful of partners (e.g., average of 8 professionals per IVC, VentureXpert), thus the individuals making investment decisions are those reaping carried interest and management fees.
In a corporate setting, the lack of rewards for positive performance has long been the rule rather than the exception. Established firms offer extremely flat compensation schemes to R&D personnel (Neumeyer, 1971; Zenger, 1994) . The experience of CVC personnel echoes this organizational reality. Specifically, the most common compensation among managers in CVC programs is fixed salary (Block and Ornati, 1987; McNally, 1997) . In recent years, one sees greater heterogeneity in CVC compensation schemes (Birkinshaw, Murray and van BastenBatenburg, 2002) . A small minority of programs offers CVC personnel high-powered incentives in the form of 'carried interest.' A larger minority compensates managers through annual bonuses based on financial or strategic metrics. Overall, the majority of CVC managers receive fixed salary, and only a smaller number of programs reward managers for success.
Extant work identifies several reasons for the lack of incentive to CVC personnel. Some firms avoid a performance-pay component simply because it generates administrative problems when employees transfer to and from a CVC program. Inability to establish and agree on performance metrics is another explanation. A major consideration is the inclination to maintain pay equality in order to avoid resentment by employees in other business units. Consistently, As a result, fixed salary is the prevalent compensation scheme. In fact, managers in many leading CVC programs did not receive any performance-pay:
"The head of German software-maker SAP AG's venture capital unit in Silicon Valley racked up a 6,000% return on his employer's first $25 million fund… Yet he still earned a straight salary just as SAP's 22,000 other employees did." (Daily Deal; Dec., 2000) "Late in December [1999] , Intel Corp. hired an outside team to structure a compensation package for its venture group that would mimic those of firms outside the corporate umbrella, including a co-investment option and a carried interest reward. After corporate management rejected the plan, citing concerns over internal equity within the organization, the venture group's top officer jumped ship for a spot at a private venture firm." (Private Equity Week; Sep., 2000) We proceed to explore the impact of corporate compensation schemes by way of comparison. Our approach is to exploit the fact that entrepreneurial ventures are funded by individuals operating in two different settings (i.e., within a CVC or an IVC). The settings differ on the dimension of interest -compensation scheme -yet both employ similar investment practices and feature comparable investment outcomes.
Compensation Scheme and Managerial Investment Practices.
Investors employ various practices to manage the level of risk they face (Gompers and Lerner, 2001 ). We conjecture that investors' compensation schemes will affect the practices they undertake. Our hypotheses focus on two well documented practices -investment stage and investment syndicate -that are universally employed by CVCs and IVCs alike.
The exposure to risk can be managed by targeting ventures at specific stages of development. The prospects of a young 'seed-stage' venture are highly uncertain. It likely still engages in R&D and has to meet technical, commercial and managerial milestones. As the venture matures, uncertainties regarding technical feasibility, commercial viability, and managerial capabilities are resolved (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Gompers, 1995) . A 'later-stage' venture experiences increasing sales and may be profitable; namely it reached most previously mentioned milestones and has only managerial goals to meet. Thus, as investors face the decision whether, and when, to provide funding, they pay close attention to ventures' developmental stage. This is reflected in the discount rates applied by investors; rates may be as high as 70% for 'seed-stage' investments and as low as 30% for 'later-stage' (Sahlman, 1990) .
Drawing on the principal-agent framework, we conjecture that highly uncertain investments are likely to be shunned by corporate personnel who are not exposed to Syndication is also instrumental in managing risk exposure. Investment syndicates are formed when two or more investors participate in the financing of a given venture (Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Brander, Amit and Antweiler, 2002 There is a small group of CVC programs that remunerate their personnel with carried interest or similar forms of performance-pay (Birkinshaw et al., 2002; McNally, 1997 Compensation Scheme and Investment Performance.
Next, we discuss the performance implications of investors' compensation schemes. Accordingly, the discussion shifts from investment practices in each round toward investors' overall performance.
The principal-agent framework guides our hypothesis once again. We conjecture that corporate venture capitalists who are not awarded performance-pay will shun high-risk high-return funding opportunities, and that this behavior will lead to inferior outcomes. In comparison to IVCs, the average corporate investor will exhibit little or no performance gains.
As noted earlier, a small number of CVCs engage in more aggressive practices. These are the CVC programs that offer performance-pay to their staff. Not only do these CVCs pursue 'IVC-like' investment practices, but also they benefit from affiliation with a large corporation.
We expect that CVC awarding performance-pay will experience more favorable outcomes.
Taken together, these conjectures suggest that the CVC-IVC performance differential may be sensitive to CVC compensation schemes.
Hypothesis 5:
Other things being equal, the use of performance-pay by a corporate investor will increase the performance gap between corporate and independent venture capital investors.
DATA AND METHODS

Data.
We construct a dataset of venture capital investments using Venture Economics database.
Venture Economics (VE) collects data through multiple sources including surveys of general partners and their portfolio ventures, government filings, etc. VE data have been used in previous studies (Gompers 1995; Guler,2007; Hochberg et al., 2007 .
We explore the impact of venture capitalists' compensation scheme (incentives) on investment practices (behavior) and outcomes (performance). The empirical analyses proceed as follows. First, the incentives-behavior relationship is studied at the round-level: analyzing each round in which CVCs and/or IVCs participate (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1998 At times, Venture Economics recorded investment disbursements that are part of a single round as separate investment rounds (Lerner, 1994) . This can affect our analysis; e.g., for a given round we may undercount the number of syndicate participants. We thus aggregate two or more consecutive rounds listed within a 90-day period as a single round. The cutoff is chosen as most term sheets specify a maximum 90-day closing window during which investors can schedule cash infusions to the portfolio company (Lerner, 1994; Guler, 2007a,b) .
(i.e., a round may, or may not, include IVCs along the CVC). 3 We compare them to 11,899 rounds involving only IVCs. Second, the incentives-performance association is analyzed at the fund-level; aggregating all investments by a focal investor (e.g., Hochberg et al., 2007) . We compare the performance of 300 corporate and 2,530 independent venture capital investors.
To discern compensation schemes of program personnel, we utilized three independent data sources: two proprietary surveys of CVC programs and an extensive press search. First, we draw on a survey conducted by Birkinshaw et al. (2002) (denoted LBS survey). The survey was mailed to CVC executives identified using Venture Economics and the Corporate Venturing Directory & Yearbook. A response rate of 30% yields rich information for ninety-five programs.
Second, we obtain an earlier survey which was conducted by a global compensation consulting firm during the peak of the 'Internet bubble' (denoted Consultant survey). The survey was mailed to programs listed on the Corporate Venturing Directory, and had a response rate of 17%.
Finally, we conducted extensive searches using Factiva press search, Lexis-Nexis, and firm reports. This effort yielded compensation information for 6% of the CVCs in our sample. 4 We assess the representativeness and reliability of the compensation data. To gauge data representativeness, we compare investment rounds for CVCs with and without compensation data (Table A1) . 5 Along all key features, the rounds involving CVC programs for which 3 We exclude 662 rounds in which two or more CVCs jointly participated (the results are robust to the inclusion of these rounds). The exclusion rationale is as follows. In rounds that involve one corporate investor or less, the market for financing is the main venue for investors' interaction. The act of syndication allows investors to share financial risks. However, in rounds involving two or more corporations, the investors also interact in the productmarket. The act of syndication may be motivated by product-market reasoning that has little to do with financial risk-sharing. Hence, focusing on rounds with one CVC or less constitutes a conservative test of the hypotheses.
4
Searches included various permutations of the keywords 'bonus', 'carry', 'carried interest', 'compensation', 'incentives', 'salary', 'tax' and programs' or parent firms' name. Results were coded by one of the authors and a research assistant (inter-coder reliability is 93%) and pertains mainly for programs affiliated with incumbents such as Comcast, GE, and Intel. Finally, we also inspect for reorganizations that pre-date the surveys and might have resulted in changes to CVC's compensation -our searches yielded no evidence to that effect.
5
As a reference, Table A1 reproduces CVC investment-rounds information reported in Gompers and Lerner (GL) (1998), Gompers (2002) . In comparison to GL data, our sample tends to involve CVC rounds in younger ventures, during earlier stages, at higher valuations, and target Internet ventures. This is not surprising given GL compensation data are available, are representative of all other CVC rounds. 6 This observation holds for all three dependent variables: investment stage, syndicate size, and fund's performance.
It also holds for other dimensions, such as venture's age, round valuation, and the size of CVC's parent firm. We observe some difference in industry affiliation, yet these are not of substantial magnitude and are explicitly controlled for in the multivariate analysis. A more notable difference is that CVC programs for which compensation data are available have an average investment history of 4.7 years compared to 3.0 years for all other programs. It likely reflects that programs with longer duration of investment tend to participate in industry surveys.
To evaluate data reliability, we triangulate information across all three data sources.
Specifically, about 80% of the respondents to the Consultant survey also appear in the later LBS survey. The observations are consistent across time. Data gleaned through press searches further corroborate programs' compensation information (whenever coverage overlaps survey respondents). In sum, we believe that our data accurately capture the compensation scheme CVC personnel were awarded during the 1990s.
Variables. Two sets of variables are constructed; one to investigate the incentives-behavior relationship, and another to study the incentives-performance association.
The first set centers on managerial actions aimed at managing investment uncertainty:
investment stage and syndicate size. The dependent variable, Investment Stage, denotes the venture's stage of development at the time of the investment round. Namely, it is a round-level variable. Building on Venture Economics definitions, we identify four major stages -Seed, study data from 1983-94, while our sample centers on CVC rounds between 1990 and 1999. We find similar patterns when comparing IVC rounds in our sample to those reported in GL. The table also reproduces fundlevel performance information from Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (HLL, 2007) . Compared to HLL, the CVCs in our sample exhibit higher success rates. This is not surprising given that HLL aggregate CVC and IVC. Indeed, we find more consistent patterns when comparing IVC performance in our sample to that in HLL.
Early, Expansion and Later -and set the value of Investment Stage to 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The independent variable, CVC/IVC, is assigned a value of one if the focal round involves a corporate investor (e.g., a mixed CVC, IVC syndicate), and zero if it consists solely of IVCs (e.g., an all-IVC syndicate). Continuing the above example, the variable is equal to zero for Vermeer and is equal to one for NetBoost. As for Figure 1 , CVC/IVC is equal to zero for Oberon (Panel A) or Times Ten (Panel B), and is equal to one for Venturecom. ***** Insert Figure 1 about here ***** Next, we explain the CVC compensation measures. Ideally, they should reflect the slope of the relationship between pay and measured performance (Guay, 1999) . In practice, prior work employs various measures, ranging from a simple sum of dollar value to a sophisticated discounting of stock options (Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1993; Balkin et al., 2000; Zenger and Marshall, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2002) . These studies utilize compensation data for top management teams, which are publicly available per SEC regulations. Such data are unavailable for CVC personnel. Rather, we construct two dichotomous variables which indicate whether a CVC program awards low-, or high-powered incentives. We use data from the LBS and Consultant surveys as well as press reports. While the lack of detailed dollar magnitudes is a disadvantage, the documentation of 'compensation schemes' may be less prone to bias (e.g., conscious over-or under-reporting).
The Consultant survey asked executives whether they offer carried interest to their CVC personnel. Almost a third (32%) of the programs responded positively. The press searches yield similar observations: 27% of the programs report carried interest as part of their compensation scheme. The LBS survey inquired about several compensation components: (a) fixed salary, (b)
performance-based bonuses, and (c) long term outcome-based pay. Rather than a Yes/No answers, respondents used five-item Likert scales to report the prevalence of each component.
For example, managers were asked how frequently they used carried interest to reward CVC managers. A third (33%) of the programs reported a score of 4 or 5, implying that their personnel are awarded high-powered incentives. We collapse the LBS responses into a single index, which allows us to utilize the full range of compensation components. 7 The index ranges from a low of 1 for programs that remunerate solely through fixed salary, to a high of 4.4 for programs that employ IVC-like carried interest.
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Scholars often combine raw data items into a single composite index; e.g., Stern (2004) (Greene, 2000) . Because multiple observations for the same venture may create correlations between the error structure and the independent variables, we report robust standard errors clustered by ventures. (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Gompers, 2002 (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983 To achieve identification and generate credible estimates, the exclusion restriction has to be satisfied (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2002; Singh and Mitchell, 2005 (Gompers and Lerner, 1998) , and a set of firm and industry factors that stimulate strategic CVC investment (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b) . 14 In 12 The 1 st stage estimates the likelihood that a CVC employs high incentives. Thus, we use a subsample of CVC rounds for which compensation data are available. Put differently, most of the rounds in the full sample (e.g., IVC rounds, CVC without compensation info) are irrelevant for our analysis. Within that subsample, univariate analysis does not find a statistically significant relationship between programs objectives and compensation schemes: Chi2 test (chi2 = 0.056; Pr = 0.813), and Fisher exact test (Pr = 0.59). 13 Nickerson and Zenger (2008: 3) 
"assert that individual employees invidiously compare their rewards with others they deem to be within their referent group (for example, see Adams 1963, Festinger 1954). If perceived differences exist, the resulting negative affect-what we refer to as envious emotion-drives individuals to… reduced effort, influence activities, departure, non-cooperativeness, or even outright sabotage." The authors single out the role of distance (page 10 onwards): "The general conclusion in the literature is that spatial proximity… [is a] primary determinants of the choice of salient referents … [page 15] increasing the physical distance among workers… restrict the scope of interaction and information sharing, thereby reducing the salience of these workers as referents."
Landier, Nair and Wulf (2007) present evidence of the effect distance has within organizations. Building on these insights, performance-pay is more likely in units that are distant from headquarters. What are the implications for CVC compensation scheme? Note that many CVC programs are located around Silicon Valley. It follows that performance-pay for CVC personnel is more likely for the Atlantaheadquartered UPS than the California-headquartered Chevron. 14 We include factors that are associated with an increase in CVC's marginal innovative output: Industry Tech Opportunities (for each industry, the natural logarithm of the average number of citation-weighted patents applied for by firms in a given year), Industry IPP (for each industry, the mean percentage of innovations for which patenting is effective mechanism for protecting IP), Industry Complementary Assets (for each industry, the importance of distribution and sales capabilities), as well as Firm R&D (firm's annual R&D expenses sum, the 1 st stage Probit regression estimates, for each corporate investor, the probability that CVC personnel are awarded high-powered incentives (Model A2-1 in Table A2 ). Binomial regression approach (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984) , and specify the following regression: Syndicate Size it = exp (X it β 1 + C it β 2 ), where Syndicate Size it is the number of syndicate members that participate in a focal round in venture i in year t, X it is a vector of independent variables denoting the presence of a CVC and its compensation scheme, C it is a vector of control variables (it also controls for venture's stage using a vector of dichotomous variables based on Investment Stage), and β 1 , β 2 are the corresponding vectors of coefficient estimates. Again, we report robust standard errors clustered by ventures.
In Model 4-1, the coefficient for CVC/IVC is positive and significant. Calculating the marginal effects, we find that rounds involving a CVC investor are associated with a syndicate divided by total assets), and Firm Cash-Flow (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization). Advantageously, data for these factors are available for all CVCs during the year they invest. 15 The differences in targeted stage across two programs that are equally likely to award high-incentives, where one does and the other does not (Greene, 2000:933) : E [Stage|likely, high-incentives] -E[Stage|likely, low-incentives] size that is 56% larger than rounds where syndicate members are all IVCs. Hence, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
In CVCs that were likely to receive high-powered incentives but did not, we find that the former programs partake in syndicates that are, on average, 51% smaller (Greene, 2000) .
Finally, we stress that the findings are distinctly consistent with syndication as a risksharing practice. Extant work identifies other syndication rationales: selection, referral, and value added. 16 Irrespective of the rationale, syndication is a voluntary structure that emerges if and only if all members agree to do so. We note that risk-sharing is the only syndication rationale which is consistent with our larger syndicates finding. Other rationales would predict that CVC/IVC syndicates should be smaller -not larger -than all-IVC syndicates. Consider, for example, the 'selection' rationale. In a syndicate that already includes a few IVCs, the marginal contribution of adding a CVC would surpass that of an additional IVC. The latter's skill set is redundant with existing syndicate members whereas the CVC has access to unique due diligence skills (e.g., corporate R&D personnel). Hence, a syndicate consisting of a CVC and two IVCs likely has better selection capabilities than a larger syndicate involving four IVCs. The 'referral'
and 'value added' rationales yield similar predictions. 16 We briefly describe three other syndications rationales. The first refers to an approval process involving multiple members which reduces the likelihood of accepting a bad project (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986) . That is, syndicates can improve the ability to select attractive targets since syndicate members serve as a source of a 'second opinion' (Bygrave, 1987) . Accordingly, Lerner (1994) finds that experienced venture capitalists syndicate early stage investments with other experienced VCs, who can provide expert opinion. The second denotes that syndication may be instrumental in building a quality future deal flow. Investor X includes investor Y in a lucrative investment in anticipation that Y, when recognizing another quality venture in the future, will syndicate it with X. Thus, syndication is motivated by anticipation of reciprocity (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001 ). This referral rationale views syndication as a vehicle to enhance deal flow (i.e., broaden the pool of investment targets), whereas the selection explanation assumes that for a given deal flow (i.e., a given pool of targets) syndication can increase the likelihood of selecting high quality ventures. Finally, syndication can be an important strategy to enhance a venture's prospects. The argument is based on the fact that each investor provides substantial valueadded services in addition to capital infusion (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza & Manigart, 1996; Brander et al., 2002) .
Compensation Scheme and Investment Performance.
We shift from analyzing investment practices at the investment-round level to studying funds' performance at the fund level. Table 5 reports OLS regression results of investors' performance. Model 5-1 shows a positive and significant coefficient on CVC. That is, corporate investors exhibit significantly better performance as measured by the rate of successful portfolio exits. 17 The economic magnitude of this effect is meaningful: CVCs experience a 10% excess in their exit rates. That is, the average exit rate of corporate investors is about one third higher than that of independent VC funds. As for the control variables, the sign and significance of all the coefficients is consistent with Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Hochberg et al. (2007) , with the exception of Fund Size having flipped sign and VC Inflow being insignificant. 17 Recall that CVCs offer post-investment services similar to IVCs, as well as leverage parent firm resources. For example, CVC-backed ventures may benefit from free access to in-house laboratories, or the ability to produce initial product batches at cost. Entrepreneurs also note the potential time advantages associated with CVCbacking: e.g., corporate endorsement critically reduces time to secure initial customers. Finally, all investors share insights regarding future industry trends. Yet, CVCs are industry leaders that not only offer unique outlook on industry trajectory, but also alert to upcoming corporate actions aimed at shaping the industry. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 5, we find that the performance of a corporate investor (weakly) dominates that of independent VC funds, if the CVC does (does not) award performance-pay. The results support our hypothesis. Moreover, they address an alternative explanation that CVCs exhibit greater exit rates simply because they fund later-stages ventures.
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The results refute this explanation: CVCs with performance-pay invest in earlier-stage deals (as per Hypothesis 3) and still outperform IVCs (per Hypothesis 5).
***** Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here ***** Model 5-3 reports a Treatment-Effects model at the fund-level. The approach follows the one in Models 3-6 and 4-6, and similarly the sample includes only corporate investors for which compensation data are available. The 1 st stage regression estimates CVC's compensation scheme decision (Model A2-2 in Table A2 ), and Model 5-3 presents 2 nd stage estimates of CVC's performance. The coefficient for CVC-Incentives-High is positive and significant. Comparing the performance of (a) CVCs with high-powered incentive, and (b) CVCs that were likely to receive such incentive but did not, we find that the latter exhibit 2.3% higher exit rates. We find that among all corporate investors, those that award performance-pay also experience the highest 18 We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
performance. This observation is in line with Hypothesis 5. As for the controls, they maintain their sign though some exhibit lower significance levels due to smaller sample size.
As a final test, we explore whether the incentive-performance association is mediated by the investment practices CVC personnel undertake. Recall, the theory predicts that incentives affect performance by shaping managerial action. The mediation test involves three steps (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Shaver, 2005) , two of which are reported above: (a) test the association between incentives and performance (see Table 5 ), (b) test if incentives shape behavior (see Tables 3, 4 ). The third step calls for the inclusion of managerial practices in a specification similar to that of the first step. To that end, we use the values of Investment Stage and Syndicate Size averaged across a fund's investment rounds. Because the error term in this regression may be correlated with that in the second step (Shaver, 2005) , we use two stage least square (2SLS) estimation. Due to space limitation, Table 6 reports results of the third regression. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The history of corporate R&D and innovation management is a history of experimentation to find the set of incentives which stimulate an entrepreneurial spirit within the organization (Coff, 2003; Merges, 1999; Zenger, 1994; Ziedonis, 2004) . Recently, there have been calls to bring 'silicon valley' -where compensation schemes follow theoretical prescription -inside the firm (e.g., Hamel, 1999) . This study investigates the frictions that arise when the logic of entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality. In doing so, we present detailed empirical evidence which offers a unique test of the principal-agent framework.
The venture capital market constitutes an advantageous setting for our investigation. A comparison of corporate and independent venture capitalists, noted Jensen (1993) , could offer valuable insights on the effect of compensation on a firm's investment in novel technologies. Gompers and Lerner (1998) similarly acknowledge the importance of research on corporate experimentation in venture financing. Yet, more than a decade later rigorous analysis remains lacking, largely due to data and measurement challenges. This paper is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to pursue the research agenda set by these scholars.
Our results underscore the impact of firm's compensation schemes. First, we find that compensation drives investment practices. Based on an analysis of 13,096 investment rounds in technology-based ventures during the 1990s, we find that CVCs target ventures at later stages of development compared to IVCs, yet the gap shrinks when CVC personnel are awarded performance-pay. Investment syndicates exhibit a similar pattern. Syndicates where a corporate investor is a member are persistently larger in size (i.e., more participants) than those involving only IVCs. The size disparity shrinks for CVC programs awarding performance-pay. Second, analysis of the 2,830 investors who disbursed these investments indicates that performance-pay not only shapes investors' behavior, but also affects their ultimate performance. Corporate investors perform at least as well as their independent counterparts, and that the performance differential is higher for CVC programs that award performance-pay.
The paper makes several contributions. First, it informs entrepreneurship scholars. Since the early observations of Block and Ornati (1987) through the recent insights of Lerner (2001) , the literature long alluded to the critical role incentives play within CVC programs. We present large scale evidence on the consequences of CVC compensation schemes.
More broadly, the paper offers distinctive support to the principal-agent framework. We study the three underling elements: incentives, behavior, and performance. Prior work tests the association between high-powered incentives and subsequent performance, and reports inconclusive evidence. We find a positive incentive-performance association, consistent with the theory. Importantly, our study is amongst the few large sample analyses to document a direct relationship between incentives and managerial behavior. Demonstrating the role of managers' actions in mediating the incentive-performance association offers strong support to the theory.
Relatedly, this study investigates strategically important, yet often ignored, corporate personnel. Most empirical work to date focuses on 'C-suite' executives (e.g., CEO and his/her top management team). This is partially due to the importance of TMT's decisions, and partially due to data availability per SEC regulations. A smaller body of work suggests that incentives awarded to non-executive managers can also affect innovative and financial outcomes (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1993; Lerner and Wulf, 2006 There is also an opportunity to explore alternative facets of investors' performance. In line with extant work (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Hochberg et al., 2007) , we measure the frequency of liquidity events (e.g., IPO, M&A) within an investor's portfolio. The measure reflects the fact that CVC-backed ventures are at least as likely to experience a favorable event -a pattern attributed to ventures' ability to leverage corporate resources (e.g., Maula and Murray, 2001; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b) and endorsement (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999) toward reducing costs, speeding time to market, or streamlining strategy. Analysis of alternative performance measures could open at least two avenues for future work.
First, one could test whether the performance of CVCs is superior to that of IVCs. The latter are investment professionals (Sahlman, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004 ), yet we observe that an average CVC portfolio exhibits liquidity events at a rate similar or greater than an IVC portfolio. Our findings may reflect the fact that CVC-backed ventures derive tangible benefits from their corporate investors. Namely, it is possible that the advantages of corporate affiliation compensate for any CVC shortcomings. Future work could study whether the performance differential is robust to alternative performance measures.
Second, subsequent work should explore whether the 'compensation effect' persists under different measures. Namely, one could replicate our analyses using alternative performance measures. Support to the principal-agent framework necessitates only that the CVC-IVC performance gap is sensitive to CVC compensation scheme, irrespective of whether the gap is positive or negative. In other words, the 'compensation effect' may manifest itself in the form of increasing a positive performance differential -as we find -or as reducing a negative gap.
Another interesting venue for future work is the impact of a CVC on its parent firm. Our discussion centers on the association between a program's compensation scheme and the fundlevel implications (e.g., CVC program's rate of successful exits). Going forward, scholars may explore whether the positive relationship between high-powered compensation and CVC performance automatically results in contribution to parent's performance.
Extant work reports that parent firm performance is sensitive to CVC activity. There is a positive association between CVC and the quality and exploratory nature of a firm's innovation output Schildt, Maula, Keil, 2005) . Corporate venture capital also affects a firm's alliance activity (Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2008) . It has a notable financial effect as well: (a) a firm's cumulative abnormal return varies significantly if it acquires a portfolio company Ziedonis, 2005, 2008) , and (b) a firm's tobin's q levels differ depending on whether its CVC program is strategically oriented (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006) .
Although high-powered incentives are associated with enhanced performance at the level of the CVC program, it remains an open question whether they necessarily result in optimal firmlevel performance. How does CVC compensation affect parent firm's performance? On one hand, we expect the positive association to persist at the parent firm level. We know that firms' performance is positively tied to the compensation of division managers and R&D unit heads (Hoskisson et al, 1993; Lerner and Wulf, 2006) . The success of a CVC program may thus translate into monetary and non-monetary benefits to its parent. To the extent that CVCs' high liquidity rates reflect an ability to sponsor novel technologies, speed time-to-market, and grow ecosystems of related products and services, the parent firm stands to profit from its CVC program.
On the other hand, the positive effect may dissipate or even turn into a negative association. 20 The presence of high-powered incentives could result in frictions between CVC personnel and other corporate employees (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008) . The frictions may erode CVC's contribution to the parent firm. For example, Xerox abandoned the practice of highpowered incentives to its Xerox Technology Ventures (XTV) personnel once it realized that their activities, while financially impressive, were failing to confer strategic benefits (Gompers and Lerner, 1998) . Moreover, because a CVC program consumes capital and human resources that the firm could have allocated elsewhere, difficulties in materializing strategic benefits could mean CVC activity might actually have an adverse effect on the parent firm.
In closing, future work could investigate whether compensation schemes that stimulate CVC's performance necessarily lead to optimal firm-level outcomes. Initial evidence suggests that is the case. In unreported analysis, we study parent firm's Tobin's q (i.e., the market valuation of a firm over the value of firm tangible assets). All else being equal, the contribution to firm value is greater when firms award high-powered incentives to CVC personnel. These preliminary results should be interpreted with caution -it is possible that firms with brighter prospects are also more likely to award performance-pay. 20 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. Adj. R2
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The table reports the mediation regression. See Table 5 for variables definitions. Estimation is based on 2SLS (Models 6-1 through 6-4) or 3SLS (Models 6-5 and 6-6). The table reports parameter coefficient estimates, robust standard errors clustered by fund's firm are in brackets (* z < 0.05, ** z < 0.01, *** z < 0.001). (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Gompers, 2002) . The superscript (a) denotes aggregate IVC and CVC exit rates for the period 1980-99, as reported in Hochberg et al (2007) . The second column describes all CVC rounds in our sample (rounds where CVC/IVC=1), the period 1990-99. The third and fourth columns describe sub-samples for which CVCs' compensation scheme is available (CVC/IVC=1 and CVC-Other=0) and unavailable (CVC/IVC=1 and CVCOther=1), respectively. Numbers in parenthesis report a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test of a null hypothesis that CVC-rounds-where-compensation-data-available and CVC-rounds-where-data-unavailable are drawn from population with the same distribution along the relevant round-feature (significant at * z<.05, ** z<.01, *** z<.001). The 1 st stage specification models the probability CVC personnel receive performance-pay. To the extent that strategically-oriented programs are less likely to offer high-powered incentives, the independent variables include Strategic CVC as well as other variables known to drive strategic CVC (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b , 2006 . We also include the distance between CVC and its headquarters. Log Likelihood -109*** -23.0***
